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ANNEX B

Critique of the Department of State's  
Action Memorandum and Staff Study

The Department's presentation appears to have been shaped to support a desired management decision and without adequate consideration of the merits of the organization and achievements of the Map Procurement Program. Indeed, the State paper recommends a USIB (or NIRB) review of map procurement requirements and the virtual abolishment of the Map Procurement Program at one and the same time. A number of specific and significant deficiencies in fact and interpretation in the Department's staff study are worthy of note.

a. The action memorandum states that the Department expends \$260,000 on the Program annually while all other agencies contribute only \$99,000. In fact, the contribution of other agencies is approximately \$312,000, [REDACTED]


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c. The staff study states that "it is not clear whether the requirements levied on this Program are regularly screened or reviewed by the USIB or the NIRB, or whether an authoritative cost-benefit assessment has been made of the continuing need for this acquisition and evaluation-dissemination system." In fact, General Robert Taylor's staff for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation recently reviewed the Program requirements. In addition, the Program was reviewed in February 1968 by the Senior Interdepartmental Group, which stated: "The worldwide map and publication procurement program is well run and has been highly productive . . . the flow is maintained at a low cost and with careful attention to high priority needs."

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d. Both the action memorandum and the staff study ignore the map needs of the Library of Congress, the Geological Survey, and the Coast and Geodetic Survey, which also are served by the Program.

e. The action memorandum differentiates between State Department map procurement needs and those of the CIA and DoD on the ground that the latter agencies have "special" needs. In fact, these "special map requirements" in large part service activities undertaken in support of the U. S. Government foreign affairs community, including support of the Department's own cartographic requirements.

f. The action memorandum is concerned with the pressure of the Program on the Department's resources. In fact, the creation of separate agency procurement programs would increase, rather than decrease, the load on already-strained embassy staffs. In this context, the staff study notes the lack of technical capability in part-time Embassy procurement officers and suggests that "a partial solution might be to strengthen their capability by training and to reemphasize map procurement activities as an important Foreign Service responsibility." This would require assignment of each map procurement officer to extensive training in geography and intelligence before they assumed such duties and clearly is not practical to undertake.

g. In proposing that each agency undertake its own procurement, the action memorandum ignores the need for a coordinating mechanism to prevent duplication of effort and gaps in coverage. Further, neither the action memorandum nor the staff study deals with the question of administering the more than 200 map exchange arrangements developed and administered by the Program.

h. The action memorandum's assumption that positions and State funds presently assigned to the Program would be retained in the Department for other purposes runs counter to the initiating Executive Order and a subsequent Bureau of the Budget confirmation that map procurement is a Department of State responsibility.

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